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1 Introduction
Although recent decades have witnessed a signiﬁcant drop in gender gaps both in developed
and developing countries, the prevalence of gender inequality is still high, especially in South
Asia, the Middle East and North Africa.1 These gaps are present in the labor market, where
women typically receive lower wages, are underrepresented in certain occupations, and work
fewer hours than men,2 as well as in several other dimensions including education, access to
productive inputs, political representation, or bargaining power inside the household.
One important aspect of gender inequality in the labor market that has not been much
studied is the presence of women in entrepreneurial activities. The World Bank (2001) es-
timates that, in developed countries, the average incidence of females among employers is
less than 30%. Everything else equal, a better use of women's potential in the labor market
is likely to result in greater macroeconomic eﬃciency. When they are free to choose their
occupation, for example, the most talented people - independently of their gender - typically
organize production carried out by others, so they can spread their ability advantage over a
larger scale. From this point of view, obstacles to women's access to entrepreneurship reduce
the average ability of a country's entrepreneurs and aﬀect negatively the way production is
organized in the economy and, hence, its eﬃciency.3
In this paper, we develop and simulate an occupational choice model that illustrates the
negative impact of gender inequality on resource allocation and thus on aggregate productivity
and income per capita. The model is then used to quantify the costs of gender inequality in
the labor market and the eﬀects of the existing labor gender gaps in a large sample of both
developed and developing countries. Our theoretical framework is an extension of the span-
of-control model by Lucas (1978). The two new elements in our model are ﬁrst the inclusion
of a third occupation, namely self-employment, on top of employers and workers, as in Gollin
(2008).4 Secondly, we introduce several exogenous frictions that only aﬀect women. In the
model, agents are endowed with entrepreneurial talent drawn from a random distribution and
choose their occupation.5 Men are unrestricted in their choices, but the limits imposed to
women's options in the labor market reduce aggregate productivity and income per capita
1See Klasen and Lamanna (2009).
2See for instance Blau and Kahn (2007, 2013).
3Elborgh-Waytek et al. (2013) also argue that gender inequality may have negative macroeconomic eﬀects.
Barsh and Yee (2012) claim that the employment of women on an equal basis would allow companies to make
a better use of talent.
4Lucas uses the term manager rather than employer but we think in our model the latter helps clarifying
the diﬀerence between an agent who runs a ﬁrm where other agents work (an employer) and an agent who
run his or her own ﬁrm without any other worker (a self-employed).
5We abstract from the decision of agents to participate or not in the labor market, i.e. all agents would
like to work unless they are banned to do so. Implicitly, we shut down, for example, the decision of whether
one of the members of the household optimally chooses to stay out of the labor market. We choose to do so
for simplicity, but also because there is no data on household's allocation of resources for a large sample of
countries.
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due to the associated ineﬃcient allocation of talent across occupations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we brieﬂy discuss the existing
papers linking labor gender inequality and economic growth, with an emphasis on those most
closely related to our work. The theoretical model is presented in Section 3. Section 4
explains the model simulation and presents the main numerical results. Section 5 discusses
the quantitative implications of our model for a large set of countries, and, ﬁnally, Section 6
concludes.
2 Literature Review
The empirical literature on the two-way relationship between economic growth and gender
inequality is quite large.6 This literature has reached some consensus on the fact that there
is a positive eﬀect of increases in income per capita on gender equality and, more relevant to
our paper, a negative eﬀect of gender inequality on economic growth.
In the theoretical literature, several studies focus on explaining the eﬀects of economic
growth on diﬀerent gender gaps, for example, Becker and Lewis (1973), Galor and Weil
(1996), Greenwood et al. (2005), Deopke and Tertilt (2009), Fernandez (2009) and Ngai
and Petrongolo (2013). Other papers have focused on the reverse eﬀect, i.e. the impact of
gender inequality on growth. These theories are, in most cases, based on the fertility and
children's human capital channels, as in Galor and Weil (1996), and Lagerlöf (2003).7 Galor
and Weil (1996), for example, argue that an increase in women's relative wage increases the
cost of raising children, which lowers population growth, increases children's education levels
and leads to higher labor productivity and growth. In our view, these theoretical papers could
be extended in two directions: ﬁrst, the models could be calibrated and simulated to produce
reasonable estimates of the costs associated to speciﬁc gender gaps. Second, it is useful to ex-
plore the relevance of a relatively ignored mechanism through which gender inequality reduces
aggregate productivity, namely, the female labor productivity channel.
With respect to the ﬁrst suggested extension, there are very few recent theoretical papers
that have been used to quantify the aggregate costs of gender inequality. Cavalcanti and
Tavares (2011) construct a growth model based on Galor and Weil (1996) in which there is
exogenous wage discrimination against women. When they calibrate their model using U.S.
data, they ﬁnd very large eﬀects associated with these wage gaps: a 50 percent increase in
the gender wage gap in their model leads to a decrease in income per capita of a quarter of
the original output. Their results also suggest that a large fraction of the actual diﬀerence in
6 See, for instance, Goldin (1990), Dollar and Gatti (1999), Tzannatos (1999), or Klasen (2002).
7Lagerlöf (2006) calibrates the Galor-Weil model but does not provide a quantitative estimate of the
productivity costs associated with a decrease in gender inequality. Cuberes and Teignier (2014) provide a
comprehensive review of the empirical and theoretical literature on the two-directional link between growth
and gender gaps.
3
output per capita between the U.S. and other countries is indeed generated by the presence
of gender inequality in wages.
In terms of building theories in which restricting women from certain occupations results in
a loss of aggregate productivity, Esteve-Volart (2009) presents a model of occupational choice
and talent heterogeneit. Her paper ﬁnds that labor market discrimination leads to lower
average entrepreneurial talent and slower female human capital accumulation which, in turn,
has a negative impact on technology adoption, innovation and economic growth. The model,
however, is only used to derive qualitative results but not to perform numerical exercises.
To our knowledge, the only existing quantitative paper that incorporates these two ex-
tensions is Hsieh et al. (2013). Their paper uses a Roy model to estimate the eﬀect of the
changing occupational allocation of white women, black men, and black women between 1960
and 2008 on U.S.'s economic growth and ﬁnds that the improved allocation of talent within
the United States accounts for 17 to 20 percent of growth over this period. Our paper diﬀers
from theirs in several dimensions. First, we study the eﬀects of gender inequality in the labor
market in a large sample of countries, rather than just focusing in one. Second, our theoretical
framework is substantially diﬀerent from theirs in that we emphasize, although, in a static
framework, the span-of-control element of agents who run ﬁrms.8
3 Model
In this section, we present a general equilibrium occupational choice model where agents
are endowed with a random entrepreneurship skill, based on which they decide to work as
either employers, self-employed, or workers. We assume an underlying distribution of en-
trepreneurial talent in the population, and study the resulting allocation of productive factors
across entrepreneurs and its consequences in terms of aggregate productivity. The model is
based on Lucas (1978), although one important diﬀerence is that we add the possibility of
working as a self-employed. This addition makes the model better suited to ﬁt the data in
developing countries, where a large fraction of the labor force is indeed self-employed.
3.1 Model Setup
The economy we consider has a continuum of agents indexed by their entrepreneurial talent
x, drawn from a cumulative distribution Γ that takes values between B and z¯. It is a closed
economy with a workforce of size N and K units of capital. A fraction λ of the labor force
are men, with the remaining 1− λ being women. Labor and capital are inelastically supplied
in the market by consumers and then combined in ﬁrms to produce an homogeneous good.
8Our paper also relates to several recent papers that have used the span-of-control model of Lucas (1978)
to study the eﬀects of ﬁnancial frictions and other cross-country diﬀerences on the misallocation of resources
and productivity. See, for example, Amaral and Quintin (2010), Antunes et al. (2008), Bhattacharya et al.
(2013), Buera et al. (2011), Buera and Shin (2013) and Erosa et al. (2010).
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Agents rent the capital stock they own to ﬁrms in exchange for the rental rate r, and decide
to become either ﬁrm workers, who earn the equilibrium wage rate w, or entrepreneurs, who
earn the proﬁts generated by the ﬁrm they manage. An agent with entrepreneurial talent level
x who chooses to hire n(x) units of labor and rent k(x) units of capital produces y(x) units of
output and earns proﬁts pi (x) = y (x)− rk (x)− wn (x), where the price of the homogeneous
good is normalized to one. As in Lucas (1978) and Buera and Shin (2011), the production
function is given by
y (x) = x
(
k(x)αn(x)1−α
)η
, (1)
where α ∈ (0, 1) and η ∈ (0, 1). The parameter η measures the span of control of en-
trepreneurs and, since it is smaller than one, the entrepreneurial technology involves an element
of diminishing returns. On the other hand, if an agent with talent x becomes self-employed and
chooses to use the amount of capital k˜ (x), his or her proﬁts are given by p˜i (x) = y˜ (x)−rk˜ (x)
and the technology he or she operates is
y˜ (x) = τxk˜(x)αη, (2)
where τ is a positive parameter that can be larger or smaller than one. As explained below,
this parameter is a useful one when we try to match our model with the data.9
Next we assume that, while men's occupational choices are unrestricted, women face several
exogenous restrictions. The ﬁrst constraint is that only a fraction µ of those women who
would like to be employers are allowed to do so, while a fraction 1− µ is excluded from that
occupation. A second constraint is that a fraction µo of those women who would like to be
self-employed are allowed to do so, while a fraction 1 − µo of those are only allowed to be
workers. Figure 1 illustrates how these constraints are linked to the talent draw of each agent
and what they imply in terms of occupational choice for women.10 The third restriction is
that if women become workers, they receive a lower wage than men since they have to pay
the a cost ψ > 0.11 Finally, the fourth friction we introduce is that only a fraction of women
9The consumption good produced by the self-employed and the capital they use is the same as the one
of the employers. However, in order to write down the market-clearing conditions it is convenient to denote
them y˜ and k˜, respectively.
10Note that we are not allowing females who are excluded from self-employment to become employers. We
think this a sensible assumption because it is hard to think of situations in which women are excluded from
being self-employed but not from being employers, which in the model requires hiring workers and renting
more capital.
11We assume that this is a deadweight cost, i.e. the cost for the employer is the same when hiring a man or
a woman. In other words, the choice of whether to hire a male or female worker does not aﬀect the employer's
proﬁts because women are in eﬀect less productive than men. One justiﬁcation for this is provided in Becker
(1957), where the presence of women in the labor force generates a negative externality on men's utility.
Female workers can also be less productive if their skills needed to be workers - not modeled here - are worse
than those of men, perhaps due to gender diﬀerences in schooling. Finally, one could also interpret ψ as a
utility cost for female workers, reﬂecting the fact that, especially in developing countries, being a worker is
associated with low ﬂexibility in the amount of working hours, generating a cost for women who contemplates
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Figure 1: Occupational choice map for women
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12zx 
Would like to be 
self‐employed
Work as self‐
employed
021 zxz 
01 
1zx 
Work as workers   
can participate at all in the labor market. Since we do not have a household sector, the rest
of the women have no output in our model.
These constraints on their occupational choices may be the result of pure discrimination
against women or they may reﬂect the rational choice of women that, for some reason not
captured in the model, decide not to work as managers or self-employed. Similarly, it could
also reﬂect the fact that women have less managerial skills than men - either because of early
discrimination in education or because of a mismatch between the education they acquired
and the skills demanded in the market.12
3.2 Agents' optimization
3.2.1 Employers
Employers choose the labor and capital they hire in order to maximize their current proﬁts
pi. The ﬁrst order conditions that characterize their optimization problem are given by
(1− α) ηxk(x)αηn(x)η(1−α)−1 = w, (3)
αηxk(x)αη−1n(x)η(1−α) = r. (4)
the possibility of having children.
12We abstract from human capital accumulation decisions in the model.
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Hence, at the optimum, all ﬁrms have the common capital-labor ratio (5):
k(x)
n(x)
=
α
1− α
w
r
, (5)
where k (x) and n (x) denote the optimal capital and labor levels for an employer with talent
level x. Intuitively, a higher w
r
ratio implies a more intensive use of capital relative to labor.
The solution values for n(x) and k(x) can be obtained combining equations (3) and (5). Both
n(x) and k(x) depend positively on the productivity level x, as equations (6) and (7) show:
n (x) =
[
xη(1− α)
(
α
1− α
)αη
wαη−1
rαη
]1/(1−η)
, (6)
k (x) =
[
xηα
(
1− α
α
)η(1−α)
rη(1−α)−1
wη(1−α)
]1/(1−η)
. (7)
3.2.2 Self-employed
When a self-employed agent with talent x chooses the capital to maximize his or her proﬁts,
the ﬁrst order condition of the problem is
τxαηk(x)αη−1 = r (8)
and so the optimal level of capital is given by
k˜(x) =
(τxαη
r
) 1
1−αη
. (9)
Figure (2) displays the shape of the two proﬁt functions and the wage earned by workers.13
3.2.3 Occupational choice
The relevant cutoﬀs for men and women are displayed in Figure (2). Here we present the
equations that deﬁne these thresholds. Men's occupational choices are determined by two
cutoﬀs. The ﬁrst one, zm1 , deﬁnes the earnings such that a man is indiﬀerent between being a
worker and a self-employed, and is given by
w = zm1 k˜ (z
m
1 )
αη − rk˜ (zm1 ) . (10)
13In order to construct this ﬁgure we are implicitly using values for the parameters τ, α, and η, such that
the three occupations are chosen in equilibrium.
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Figure 2: The occupational map
x
w
1z 2z
)(xepi
)(xspi
Workers Self-
employed
Employers
If x ≤ zm1 men choose to become workers, and if x > zm1 they become self-employed or
employers. If they become workers they obviously do not hire any capital or labor input.
Women, on the other hand, face a ﬁxed cost ψ > 0 if they choose to be workers and so their
ﬁrst threshold zf1 is given by
w − ψ = zf1 k˜
(
zf1
)αη
− rk˜
(
zf1
)
. (11)
If x ≤ zf1 women choose to become workers, and if x > zf1 they (potentially) become self-
employed or employers.14 As before, both the labor and capital demand for female workers
is zero. The second cutoﬀ, z2, determines the choice between being a self-employed or an
employer. This threshold is the same for men and women and it is given by
τz2k˜(z2)
αη − rk˜(z2) = z2x
(
k(z2)
αn(z2)
1−α)η − rk (z2)− wn(z2) (12)
so that if x > z2 every man becomes an employer and every woman attempts to do so
3.3 Competitive Equilibrium
In equilibrium, the total demand of capital by employers and self-employed must be equal
to the exogenously given aggregate capital endowment K. Assuming an upper bound z¯ on
14We say potentially because, as stated above, only a fraction µ0(µ) of women who want to be self-employed
(employers) are allowed to be so, respectively.
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talent,15 this condition is given by
λ
 z¯ˆ
z2
k(x)dΓ(x) +
z2ˆ
zm1
k˜(x)dΓ(x)
 +
(1− λ)
µ z¯ˆ
z2
k(x)dΓ(x) + (1− µ)µ0
z¯ˆ
z2
k˜(x)dΓ(x) + µ0
z2ˆ
zf1
k˜(x)dΓ(x)
 = K/N. (13)
The ﬁrst bracket represents the demand for capital by male employers and male self-employed.
Females' demand for capital is calculated in the second bracket and it has three components.
The ﬁrst one represents women with enough ability to be employers who are allowed to be so.
The second term shows the fraction of women who, after being banned from employership,
they become self-employed. Finally, the third term denotes the demand for capital from
women with enough ability to be self-employed and that are allowed to do so.
In the labor market, the total demand of workers must also be equal to its total supply:
λ
 z¯ˆ
z2
n(x)dΓ(x)
+ (1− λ)
µ z¯ˆ
z2
n(x)dΓ(x)
 =
λΓ(zm1 ) + (1− λ)
[
Γ(zf1 ) + (1− µ)(1− µ0)(1− Γ(z2)) + (1− µ0)(Γ(z2)− Γ(zf1 ))
]
. (14)
The left-hand-side of this expression represents the labor demand for men with ability above
z2 and women with ability above this same cut-oﬀ that are allowed to be employers. The
right-hand-side is the labor supply. The ﬁrst term is the fraction of men with ability less or
equal to zm1 . The term in brackets has three components: the ﬁrst one is the fraction of least
able women, those with ability below the threshold zf1 . The second term is the fraction of
women with enough ability to be employers but that are excluded from both being employers
(a fraction 1− µ) and self-employed (a fraction 1− µ0). Finally, the last term is the fraction
of women with ability just enough to be self-employed but not to be employers that are not
allowed to work as self-employed.
15In the next section we discuss how, without this bound, the integrals in the equations (13) and (14) are
not well-deﬁned.
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In this economy, aggregate income per capita is equal to total production per capita,
y ≡ Y
N
= λ
 z¯ˆ
z2
y(x)dΓ(x) +
z2ˆ
zm1
y˜(x)dΓ(x)
 +
(1− λ)
µ z¯ˆ
z2
y(x)dΓ(x) + (1− µ)µ0
z¯ˆ
z2
y˜(x)dΓ(x) + µ0
z2ˆ
zf1
y˜(x)dΓ(x)
 (15)
where y(x) and y˜(x) are deﬁned in equations (1) and (2), respectively.
A competitive equilibrium in this economy is a triplet of cutoﬀ levels (zm1 , z
f
1 , z2), a set of
quantities
[
n (x) , k (x) , k˜ (x)
]
,∀x, and prices (w, r) such that equations (6) -(14) are satisﬁed;
that is agents choose their occupation optimally, entrepreneurs choose the amount of capital
and labor to maximize their proﬁts, and all markets clear.
3.4 Gender Gaps in Labor Force Participation
As discussed in Section 3.1., another type of gender gap that we introduce in the model is
the exclusion of women from the work force, both as entrepreneurs and employees. If we keep
the capital stock ﬁxed, when a fraction of women does not supply labor to the market, output
per worker in our model mechanically increases due to the presence of diminishing returns to
labor. Income per capita, however, decreases. Formally, recalling that N denotes the total
labor force and deﬁning P as total population, we have Y
P
= N
P
y. With this formulation, it
is then possible to study the impact of reducing the employment-to-population ratio N/P
below 1. Under the assumptions that men represent 50% of the population and that all male
participate in the labor force, Lm = 0.5P . Thus, given that we deﬁned λ as the fraction of
men in the labor force, λ ≡ Lm
N
, the fraction of females in the labor force over the fraction
of males in the labor force is equal to 1−λ
λ
and so 1 − 1−λ
λ
represents the fraction of females
excluded from the labor force.
3.5 Comparative Statics
In this subsection we show qualitatively how the model 's occupational choice is aﬀected
by exogenous changes in three of the friction parameters, namely the fraction of women who
can work as employers (µ), the fraction of women who can work as self-employed (µ0), and
the wage loss for women (ψ). Figure (3) shows the qualitative eﬀects of a decline in µ and µ0,
while the eﬀect of an increase in the wage gap ψ is displayed in Figure (4).
3.5.1 An increase in managerial gender gaps (↓ µ)
A decrease in µ initially generates a decline in the number of employers and hence a decrease
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Figure 3: Eﬀects of µ− gap and µo − gap
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Figure 4: Eﬀects of ψ − gap
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in the labor demand and the equilibrium wage, which decreases the cutoﬀ z1. Everything else
equal, this results in an increase in proﬁts for the remaining employers, which reduces the
cutoﬀ z2. The eﬀect on the demand for capital is ambiguous since the demand from employers
declines but that of the self-employed increases.
3.5.2 An increase in self-employment gender gaps (↓ µ0)
A decrease in µ0 generates a decline in the number of self-employed and hence an increase
in the labor supply, which in turn drives wages down. As in the previous case, this has a
direct negative eﬀect on the cutoﬀ z1 as well as an indirect negative eﬀect on the cutoﬀ z2,
through its eﬀect on the employers' proﬁt function. As before, whether the demand for capital
increases or decreases is a quantitative question since there is a negative eﬀect from the drop
in self-employed and a positive one from the rise in employers. If it actually decreases, the
cost of renting capital goes down, so both self-employed and employers' proﬁts increase, so
both cutoﬀs z1 and z2 further decrease.
3.5.3 An increase in wage discrimination (↑ ψ)
An increase in the wage cost ψ shifts female workers' earnings down and, everything else
equal, this makes self-employment a more attractive occupation for women. This decreases
the cutoﬀ zf1 and the associated drop in the labor supply pushes wages up, reducing employers'
proﬁts. At the same time, the demand for capital increases, which pushes the rental price
upwards, reducing proﬁts for both employers and self-employed, and hence increasing the
cutoﬀs z1 and z2.
4 Model Simulation
4.1 Skill Distribution
To simulate the model, we use a Pareto function for the talent distribution, as in Lucas
(1978) and Buera et al. (2011). As a consequence, the ﬁrm size distribution is also Pareto,
which is consistent with papers showing that the U.S ﬁrm size distribution ﬁts remarkably
well a Pareto distribution with parameter equal to one, known as Zipf's Law.16
The cumulative distribution of talent is
Γ (x) =
1−Bρx−ρ
1−Bρz¯−ρ , 0 ≤ x ≤ z¯, (16)
where we assumed an upper bound z¯ on talent, and ρ, B > 0. The density function of talent
is then
γ (x) =
ρBρx−ρ−1
1−Bρz¯−ρ , 0 ≤ x ≤ z¯. (17)
16See Axtell (2001) and Gabaix (2012).
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Using equations (6) and (17), we can derive the density function of the ﬁrms' size, n:
s (n) = γ
(
n−1 (x)
)
= γ
(
n1−η
η(1− α)
(
α
1− α
)−αη
w−αη+1
r−αη
)
=
ρBρ
1−Bρz¯−ρn
−(1−η)(1+ρ)
(
η(1− α)
(
α
1− α
)αη
wαη−1
rαη
)1+ρ
. (18)
This shows that the distribution of ﬁrms size is also Pareto and, if (1− η) (1 + ρ) = 1, it
satisﬁes Zipf's law.17
4.2 Model Parametrization
Table 1: Parameter values
Parameter Value Explanation
B 1 Normalization
η 0.79 From Buera and Shin (2011)
ρ 3.76
To satisfy Zipf's Law for distribution
of ﬁrms' size:− (1− η) (−1− ρ) ≈ 1
α 0.378 To match capital share: αη = 0.3
z¯ 4.96
To match average fraction
entrepreneurs in data: 2.8%
τ 0.94
To match fraction own-account
workers in data: 26.6%, on average
Table (1) shows the parameter values used in the simulations. The parameter B of the
Pareto distribution is normalized to 1, while the parameter η is taken from the literature. On
the other hand, the parameters ρ and α are chosen to match some stylized facts. Finally, the
parameters z¯ and τ are calibrated to minimize the distance between some moments of our
data and the predictions of the model.
Speciﬁcally, the span-of-control parameter η is set equal to 0.79, following Buera and Shin
(2011).18 The value used for the parameter ρ is set equal to 3.76 so that the talent distribution
satisﬁes Zipf's Law.19 The capital exponent parameter α is set to 0.38 in order to make αη
equal to 30%, as in Buera and Shin (2011), since 30% is the value typically used for the
17If we use an unbounded Pareto distribution, i.e. z¯ → ∞, we need to assume that ρ > 11−η so that the
integral
´ z¯
z
x
1
1−η dΓ(x) is deﬁned. This, however, implies 1 + ρ > 11−η , which contradicts Zipf's Law for the
distribution of ﬁrms' size. See Appendix A.
18Buera and Shin (2011) choose η to match the fraction of total income of the top ﬁve per cent of earners
in the U.S. population, which is 30%, given that top earners are are always entrepreneurs in the model and in
most cases in their data.
19This value is not very diﬀerent than the one used by Buera, Kaboski and Shin (2011), 4.84, which they
choose to match the employment share of the largest 10 percent of establishments in the U.S.
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aggregate income share of capital and we are considering the entrepreneurs' earnings as labor
income.
The talent upper bound z¯ is set equal to 4.96 to make the world-average share of employers
predicted by the model match the one observed in our data set, which is equal to 2.81%.20
Finally, the self-employed productivity parameter, τ , is assumed to be country-speciﬁc and it
is estimated in a country-by-country basis to match the fraction of own-account workers in
the data. To derive the results of this section, τ is set equal to 0.94, which is the cross-country
average of the values estimated in Section 5.
4.3 Potential income losses from gender gaps
Table 2 shows the income per worker losses caused by the introduction of the diﬀerent
gender gaps considered in this paper. As stated above, women are assumed to be identical
to men in all dimensions, so in the absence of gender gaps, their occupational choices are the
same as those of males. When the four gender gaps (µ, µ0, ψ, λ) are introduced, however, the
eﬃcient allocation is distorted and, as a result, there is a decline in aggregate income per
worker and/or per capita.21
The ﬁrst row shows that the income decline is almost 7% when we exclude all women from
the possibility of being employers, while the second row shows that income falls by about 2%
when all females are excluded from self-employment. When we reduce the wage earned by
females by 50%, on the other hand, income decreases by more than 4%, and when we exclude
all women from the labor market income per capita falls by almost 40%.
When the highest possible µ-gap is introduced, i.e. when no female works as an employer,
our model predicts a 10% fall in the wage rate, a 6.8% fall in the capital rental rate and
output per worker, as well as an increase of about 45% in the fraction of male employers and
42% in the fraction of male self-employed and an increase of 63% in the fraction of female
self-employed. Similarly, when the highest µo-gap is introduced, the fraction of males choosing
to be employers or self-employed increases by about 10%, while the fraction of female workers
increases by 31%. The ﬁnal decrease on the wage rate is about 2.5%, while the fall in the
20The cross-country weighted average of the entrepreneurs' share in the data is computed using data on the
variable Employers from the International Labor Organization, Table 3 - Status in Employment (by sex), as
described in the next section. The weights of each country are equal to the country's employment over total
employment in our sample.
21 As explained before, we refer to the gaps generated by µ and µ0 as the percentage of women excluded
from entrepreneurship and to the one generated by λ as the percentage of women excluded from the labor
force. However, we do not make any claim on whether this exclusion is voluntary or not since there may be
reasons other than discrimination that explain these gaps.
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Table 2: Potential eﬀects of gender gaps
Income loss
Due to highest possible µ-gap
(µ = 1 → µ = 0) 6.85%
Due to highest possible µo-gap
(µo = 1 → µo = 0) 1.96%
Due to highest possible ψ-gap
(ψ = 0 → ψ = 0.5w ) 4.25%
Due to highest possible λ-gap
(λ = 0.5 → λ = 1) 38.4%
capital rental rate and output per worker is about 2%.
On the other hand, when a wage gap equal to half of the frictionless wage is introduced, the
fraction of self-employed females rises from 23% to 83%, while the fraction of male employers
and self-employed decreases by about 25%. The equilibrium wage rate, in turn, increases by
13.6% while the capital rental rate and output per worker decrease by 4.25%. Finally, the
exclusion of all females from the labor force aﬀects income per capita negatively because fewer
people work, even if output per worker increases. In particular, when only men supply their
labor force and the capital stock is constant, the wage rate and output per worker increases
by more than 23% because there are decreasing returns to scale to labor. When taking into
account that only half of the population work, income per capita falls by about 38.4%.
The eﬀects of the highest possible µ−gap on the talent distribution and the talent thresh-
olds are presented graphically in Figure 5. Speciﬁcally, this ﬁgure shows that when women
are not eligible as employers, the density function of employer candidates shifts downwards
while both the employer and self-employed thresholds fall.22
4.4 Interactions between gender gaps
The values in Table 2 correspond to a situation where each gender gap is introduced and
there is no other gap present. The values in Table 3, on the other hand, show that the eﬀect
of each gender gap is diﬀerent depending on the value of the other gaps. As one can see in
column 2, when there are no other gaps, the eﬀect of the highest possible µ-gap is an income
loss of almost 7%, but when the µo-gap is as high as possible, the eﬀect becomes higher than
10% because women do not use their entrepreneurial talent neither as employers nor as self-
22Note that this ﬁgure is consistent with the illustrative Figure 3.
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Figure 5: Graphical eﬀects of µ− gap
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employed. When there is also a ψ-gap equal to one third of the frictionless wage, the eﬀect of
the µ-gap increases only slightly to 7.5%. However, when a λ-gap corresponding to λ = 0.75
(i.e. when 2/3 of females are excluded from the labor force), the eﬀect of the µ-gap falls to
3%, the reason being that the aggregate eﬀect of excluding females from being employers is
smaller the lower is the fraction of females in total labor force.
Similarly, as shown in column 3, the eﬀect of the µo-gap rises from 1.96% to 5.6% when it
is interacted with the µ-gap because no female takes advantage of the wage fall by becoming
employer. However, the eﬀect of the µo-gap shrinks to 1% when interacted with the λ-gap and
to 0.25% when interacted with the ψ-gap because it almost oﬀsets all the distortion caused
by the µo-gap in the decision between being a worker or a self-employed. To obtain the total
income loss due to gender gaps in entrepreneurship, one has to compute the eﬀect of excluding
all women from both employership and self-employment. This corresponds to adding up the
6.85% in column 1 of Table 2 and the 5.6% in column 2 (or, equivalently, adding up the 10.3%
in column 1 and the 1.96% in column 2) which gives an income loss of 12.3% approximately.
Finally, the eﬀect of the ψ-gap (a reduction in female wages by one third) goes from 4.25%
to 5.4% if the µ-gap is also present, but it does not change at all if the µo-gap is present. The
reason for this last result is that ψ does not ineﬃciently increase the fraction of self-employed
females because all women are already excluded from self-employment. When we add the
λ-gap, the cost of the ψ-gap becomes 2.2% since there are less women in the labor force and,
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Table 3: Income losses due to each gender gap when other gaps are present
Eﬀects µ-gap Eﬀects µo-gap Eﬀects ψ-gap
No other gaps 6.85% 1.96% 4.25%
µ-gap also present
(µ = 1 → µ = 0) 5.6% 5.4%
µo -gap also present
(µo = 1 → µo = 0) 10.3% 0%
ψ-gap also present
(ψ=0 → ψ=1
3
w )
7.5% 0.25%
λ-gap also present
(λ=0.5 → λ=0.75) 3% 1% 2.2%
therefore, the aggregate eﬀects are smaller.
5 Cross-country analysis
In this section, we use labor market data for 126 countries from the International Labor
Organization (KILM, 7th Edition Table 3 - Status in Employment, by sex) for the latest
available year. The variables used are the labor force participation, the number of employers,
and the number of own-account workers (which we identify as self-employed in our paper),
all of them by gender. Speciﬁcally, the variable Employers is deﬁned in KILM as those who,
working on their own or with a few partners, hold the type of jobs deﬁned as self-employment
jobs, and, in this capacity, have engaged, on a continuous basis, one or more persons to work
for them as employee(s), while the variable Own-account workers are those workers who,
working on their own account or with one or more partners, hold the type of job deﬁned as
self-employment jobs, and have not engaged on a continuous basis any employees to work for
them.23
5.1 Country-speciﬁc parameters
For each country, we compute the parameter τi, which represents the relative productivity
of the self-employed as well as the gender gap parameters, µi, µoi, ψi, and λi. Table 4 gives, for
each parameter, the range of values we obtained and the data moments used in the calculation,
while the values for each speciﬁc country can be found in Appendix B.24
The parameter λi determines the labor force participation gender gap, which is equal to
23In KILM, the category self-employed is subdivided in four groups: employers, own-account workers,
members of producers' cooperatives, and contributing family workers. Given the deﬁnition of each of these
groups, we have decided that the most sensible choice was to use own-account workers to represent the self-
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Table 4: Country speciﬁc parameters
Parameter Value
λi ∈ [50%, 88.8%] Equal to fraction of males inlabor force, for each country
µi ∈ [17%, 100%] Equal to female-male ratioemployers, for each country
µoi ∈ [0%, 100%] To match female-male ratioself-employed, for each country
ψi
∈ [0, 24%]
as a fraction of the wage rate
To match female-male ratio
self-employed (if µoi = 1)
τi ∈ [65.5%, 148.4%] To match % self-employed inlabor force, for each country
1− 1−λi
λi
, as explained in section 3.4. λi is computed directly from the data and it is equal to
the fraction of males in the country's labor force. It ranges from 0.5 to 0.88, which implies that
the fraction of females excluded from the labor market is between 0% and 86%. Similarly, the
parameter µi, which determines the employers' gender gap 1 − µi, is also computed directly
from the data as the ratio of female to male employers. The smallest value found is 0.17 while
the largest is 1, meaning that the fraction of females excluded from employership ranges from
0% to 83%.
The rest of the country-speciﬁc parameters, µoi, ψi and τi, are inferred from the data
to simultaneously match some data moments related to the observed occupational choices,
taking into account that these choices are in turn aﬀected by other parameters of the model.
In particular, the parameter µo is computed to match the female-to-male ratio of self-employed,
since it determines the self-employed gender gap 1 − µo. The estimated values range from 0
to 1, meaning that the inferred self-employed gap is 0 in some countries and 100% in some
other countries. It turns out that our model does not generate enough female self-employed
to match the data in about 20% of the countries. When this happens, we introduce the wage
gap parameter ψ to match the female-to-male ratio of self-employed perfectly. The largest
wage gap inferred is equal to 24% of the country's equilibrium wage, while for 80% of the
countries - those for which the model predicted enough self-employed to match the data, we
infer a wage gap equal to zero.
Finally, the self-employed relative productivity parameter, τ , is computed to match the
employed in our model, and assume that the rest of the categories are workers.
24Appendix D shows the results of our simulations for every country included in the sample. Notable
omissions are the United States, Canada, and China for which the latest version of KILM does not provide
the necessary data.
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fraction of self-employed to employers in each country. It determines the productivity ratio
between a self-employed and an employer with the same entrepreneurial talent renting the
same amount of capital and hiring only one worker. We ﬁnd that it takes values between 0.65
and 1.48, and that it is below one in almost 70% of the countries in our sample, indicating
that for the model to match the data, working as a self-employed must create some kind of
productivity disadvantage.25
5.2 Cross-country results
The cross-country results obtainedare summarized in Table 5 and Figure 6. In Table 5
we split our sample of countries in 7 geographic regions, Central Asia (6), East Asia and
the Paciﬁc (14), Europe (29), Latin America and the Caribbean (27), Middle East and North
Africa (14), South Asia (8), and Sub-Saharan Africa (28).26 For each region, column (2)
shows the average labor force participation gender gap whereas columns (3) and (4) show the
average gender gaps for employers and self-employed, respectively. The wage gap is displayed
in column (5). The last two columns of the table show how these frictions translate into average
losses in income per capita. The total average income loss is shown in column (6), and column
(7) shows the fraction of this loss generated by the occupational restrictions (including the
wage gap). The diﬀerence between columns (6) and (7), not shown in the table, would be the
income loss generated by the exclusion of women from the labor market.
Our results suggest the existence of remarkable diﬀerences in gender gaps across regions,
which lead to signiﬁcant variation in the implied income losses. The region with the largest
income loss is Middle East and North Africa (MENA) where, according to our estimates, the
total income loss is 27% and the income loss due to occupational choice gaps is 6.9%. South
Asia (SA) has the second largest income losses due to gender gaps, 19.2%, a fourth of which is
due to occupational gaps. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), on the other hand, is the region with the
lowest total income loss due to gender gaps, 8.5%, and also with the lowest entrepreneurship
gender gaps, while Europe (EU) is the region with the lowest labor participation gender gap,
15.1%, and the second lowest total income loss, 10.4%.
The total income loss caused by these gender gaps for each country in our sample is shown
in the map of Figure 6. As it is apparent, the countries with the highest costs associated with
gender gaps are located in the Middle East and North Africa, South Asia, and to a lesser
extent, Latin America and the Caribbean.
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Table 5: Income loss due to gender gaps, by region
LFP
GG, avg
λ− gap
%
Empl.
GG, avg
µ− gap
%
Self
GG, avg,
µo − gap
%
Wage
GG, avg
ψ − gap
%
Total income
loss from
Gender Gaps
(%)
Income loss
due to
Entrepr. Gap
(%)
CA 21.1 65.9 25.4 1.8 11.3 4.9
EAP 21.6 53.6 48 0 11.8 5
EU 15.1 619 54.4 0 10.4 5.8
LAC 31 53.3 24.3 1.4 14 4.1
MENA 67.6 74.5 53 2.2 27.4 6.9
SA 46.7 54.9 28.6 2.9 19.2 4.9
SSA 15.9 52.7 17.3 3.4 8.5 3.3
Figure 6: World map of total income loss due to gender gaps
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6 Conclusion
This paper uses an occupational choice model to quantify the eﬀects of gender gaps in the
labor market on aggregate productivity and income per capita. Our numerical results show
that gender gaps in entrepreneurship have signiﬁcant eﬀects on the allocation of resources and
so on aggregate productivity, while the gap from labor force participation has a large eﬀect
on income per capita. Speciﬁcally, if no women worked as an employer or a self-employed, our
model predicts that income per worker would drop by around 12%, while if the labor force
participation of women was zero, income per capita would decrease by almost 40%.
When we carry out the country-by-country analysis, we ﬁnd that there are important
diﬀerences across countries and geographical regions. To sum up our results, gender inequality
creates an average income loss of 13.5%, which can be decomposed in losses due to gaps in
occupational choices of about 5% and losses due labor force participation gaps of about 8.5%.
The region with the largest income loss due to gender inequality is Middle East and North
Africa, with an average income loss of 27%, followed by South Asia and Latin America and
the Caribbean, with average income losses of 19% and 14%, respectively.
In terms of future research, we are considering to extend this framework in several diﬀerent
directions. First, introducing a fourth occupational choice, namely subsistence or out-of-
necessity self-employed, in order to capture the fact that in many developing countries some
of the own-account workers may have a lower talent than workers.27 Second, it may be
sensible to relax the assumption that the goods produced by employers and self-employed
are the same ones. For instance, it seems reasonable to think that, in the real world, most
of the goods produced by self-employed belong to the service sector, while employers mostly
produce manufacturing goods. Provided we could ﬁnd data on the the sectoral composition
of countries and the range of diﬀerent goods produced by employers and self-employed, we
would then be able to recalibrate our model and presumably ﬁnd much larger eﬃciency costs
associated to gender gaps in the labor market. A third possible extension would be to introduce
a household production sector in the model leading to a division of labor between husbands
and wives, as in Becker (1981). This could explain some of the observed diﬀerences in labor
participation and access to entrepreneurship between males and females and help identifying
what fraction of these gaps can be considered gender discrimination. Finally, it would be
interesting to develop a dynamic version of the span-of-control model presented in this paper
25A value of τ above one in country i implies that being a self-employed instead of an employer has a
productivity advantage in country i. This could be due to regulation or other policy-related variables that
treat self-employed and employers diﬀerently.
26We follow the World Bank to assign each country to a region, with the exception of countries that belong
in the Europe and Central Asia group, which we have decided to split in two geographical regions, Europe
and Central Asia, since we believe the labor markets in these two regions are very diﬀerent. The numbers in
parentheses indicate the number of countries assigned to each region.
27See, for instance, Poschke (2013).
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(see, for instance, Caselli and Gennaioli 2012), which would allow us to quantify the eﬀects of
gender gaps on fertility as well as physical and human capital accumulation.
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A Results for Pareto talent distribution
As explained in Section 4, we assume that the entrepreneurial talent of agents is distributed
according to the bounded Pareto distribution
Γ (x) =
1−Bρx−ρ
1−Bρz¯−ρ , for 0 ≤ x ≤ z¯.
where z denotes the upper bound of the distribution. Using this functional form, we get that
z¯ˆ
z
x
1
1−η dΓ(x) =
z¯ˆ
z
x
1
1−η
ρBρx−ρ−1
1−Bρz¯−ρdx =
z¯ˆ
z
ρBρ
x
1
1−η−ρ−1
1−Bρz¯−ρdx =
ρBρ
1
1−η − ρ
[
z
1
1−η−ρ − z 11−η−ρ
1−Bρz¯−ρ
]
.
B Country-by-country results28
Year
Region Empl. Self LFP Wage
Tau
Total inc. Inc. loss
loss from from occup
group gg gg gg gg gender gaps gender gaps
Algeria 2004 MENA 0.78 0 0.79 0.06 0.94 0.31 0.05
Antigua 2001 LAC 0.49 0.45 0.01 0 0.76 0.05 0.04
Argentina 2010 LAC 0.48 0.33 0.29 0 0.89 0.13 0.04
Armenia 2008 CA 0.92 0.30 0.19 0 0.92 0.13 0.08
Australia 2008 EAP 0.37 0.48 0.17 0 0.79 0.09 0.03
Austria 2010 EU 0.60 0.46 0.14 0 0.74 0.10 0.05
Azerbaijan 2008 CA 0.81 0 0.02 0.07 1.10 0.04 0.04
Bahrain 2010 MENA 0.71 0.95 0.74 0 0.68 0.30 0.07
Bangladesh 2005 SA 0.64 0.65 0.69 0 1.33 0.28 0.08
28Variable 3: World Bank region (EAP: East Asia and Paciﬁc, EU: Europe, CA: Central Asia, LAC: Latin
America and the Caribbean, MENA: Middle East and North Africa, SA: South Africa, SSA: Sub-Saharan
Africa); variable 4: gender gap in employership (fraction of women excluded from employership relative to
men; source: own calculations from ILO data); variable 5: gender gap in self-employment (fraction of women
excluded from self-employment relative to men; source: own results from ILO data); variable 6: gender gap
in labor force participation (fraction of women excluded from the labor force relative to men; source: own
calculations from ILO data); variable 7: wage gender gap (female wage loss relative to males; source: own
results); variable 8: Relative productivity self-employment (source: own results); variable 9: total income loss
due to gender gaps (source: own results); variable 10: income loss due to gender gaps in occupational choices
(source: own results).
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Year
Region Empl. Self LFP Wage
Tau
Total inc. Inc. loss
loss from from occup
group gg gg gg gg gender gaps gender gaps
Barbados 2004 LAC 0.75 0.57 0.07 0 0.84 0.09 0.07
Belgium 2010 EU 0.61 0.55 0.17 0 0.78 0.11 0.06
Belize 2005 LAC 0.47 0.25 0.48 0 0.90 0.19 0.04
Bhutan 2010 SA 0 0 0.07 0.02 0.98 0.02 0.00
Bolivia 2009 LAC 0.59 0.14 0.19 0 1.00 0.10 0.04
Bostwana 2006 SSA 0.48 0 0.09 0.02 0.98 0.05 0.03
Brazil 2009 LAC 0.52 0.38 0.26 0 0.91 0.13 0.04
Bulgaria 2010 EU 0.53 0.49 0.10 0 0.77 0.08 0.05
Burkina Faso 2006 SSA 0.68 0.61 0.16 0 1.15 0.12 0.07
Cambodia 2008 EAP 0.27 0.54 0 0 1.15 0.04 0.04
Cameroon 2001 SSA 0.47 0 0.03 0.03 1.20 0.03 0.01
Cape Verde 2000 SSA 0.50 0.07 0.15 0 0.97 0.08 0.03
Chad 1993 SSA 0.67 0.31 0.06 0 1.30 0.06 0.04
Chile 2008 LAC 0.47 0.17 0.41 0 0.92 0.17 0.03
Colombia 2010 LAC 0.57 0.08 0.32 0 1.09 0.13 0.03
Congo 2005 SSA 0.68 0 0 0.12 1.25 0.02 0.02
Costa Rica 2010 LAC 0.60 0.25 0.41 0 0.88 0.18 0.05
Cote d'Ivoire 2002 SSA 0.37 0.27 0.22 0 1.17 0.10 0.03
Cyprus 2010 EU 0.82 0.56 0.17 0 0.80 0.13 0.08
Czech Republic 2010 EU 0.64 0.54 0.25 0 0.84 0.14 0.06
Denmark 2010 EU 0.70 0.71 0.09 0 0.73 0.09 0.07
Djibouti 1996 MENA 0.32 0 0.45 0.23 0.99 0.18 0.03
Dominica 2001 LAC 0.47 0.38 0.35 0 0.96 0.15 0.04
Dominic Republic 2010 LAC 0.45 0.59 0.27 0 1.09 0.13 0.05
Ecuador 2010 LAC 0.55 0.02 0.36 0 0.98 0.15 0.03
Egypt 2007 MENA 0.80 0.13 0.73 0 0.82 0.29 0.07
El Salvador 2010 LAC 0.41 0 0.27 0.10 0.95 0.12 0.03
Estonia 2010 EU 0.76 0.68 0 0 0.72 0.08 0.08
Ethiopia 2005 SSA 0.75 0.57 0.14 0 1.11 0.11 0.07
Fiji 2005 EAP 0 0.27 0.56 0 0.97 0.21 0.01
Finland 2010 EU 0.65 0.58 0.06 0 0.78 0.08 0.06
France 2010 EU 0.68 0.65 0.10 0 0.75 0.09 0.07
Gabon 2005 SSA 0.45 0 0.28 0.08 1.11 0.11 0.02
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Georgia 2008 CA 0.49 0.39 0.13 0 1.06 0.08 0.04
Germany 2010 EU 0.62 0.57 0.15 0 0.74 0.10 0.06
Greece 2010 EU 0.61 0.35 0.33 0 0.92 0.15 0.05
Grenada 1998 LAC 0.38 0.09 0.32 0 0.86 0.13 0.03
Guatemala 2004 LAC 0.55 0 0.46 0.04 0.98 0.19 0.03
Honduras 2010 LAC 0.31 0 0.43 0.04 1.07 0.16 0.01
Hong Kong 2010 EAP 0.73 0.78 0.10 0 0.75 0.10 0.07
Hungary 2010 EU 0.52 0.56 0.13 0 0.75 0.09 0.05
India 2010 SA 0.67 0.26 0.65 0 1.30 0.26 0.04
Indonesia 2009 EAP 0.66 0.37 0.39 0 1.14 0.17 0.05
Iran 2008 MENA 0.85 0.40 0.80 0 1.03 0.32 0.07
Ireland 2010 EU 0.69 0.79 0.13 0 0.83 0.11 0.07
Israel 2008 MENA 0.75 0.66 0.13 0 0.75 0.11 0.07
Italy 2010 EU 0.58 0.44 0.32 0 0.87 0.15 0.05
Jamaica 2008 LAC 0.45 0.30 0.23 0 1.05 0.11 0.04
Japan 2008 EAP 0.72 0.67 0.29 0 0.75 0.15 0.07
Kazakhstan 2010 CA 0.35 0 0.05 0.02 0.97 0.04 0.02
Korea 2008 EAP 0.59 0.42 0.28 0 0.89 0.14 0.05
Kuwait 2005 MENA 0.76 0.97 0.66 0 0.69 0.27 0.08
Kyrgyzstan 2006 CA 0.56 0.31 0.27 0 1.03 0.13 0.04
Laos 2005 EAP 0.55 0.55 0 0 1.14 0.06 0.06
Latvia 2010 EU 0.49 0.49 0 0 0.74 0.04 0.04
Lebanon 2007 MENA 0.86 0.68 0.67 0 0.95 0.28 0.09
Lesotho 1999 SSA 0 0.13 0.22 0 1.38 0.09 0.01
Liberia 2010 SSA 0.23 0 0 0.06 1.25 0.01 0.01
Lithuania 2010 EU 0.67 0.54 0 0 0.75 0.06 0.06
Luxembourg 2010 EU 0.59 0.53 0.23 0 0.71 0.13 0.05
Madagascar 2003 SSA 0.30 0.32 0.04 0 1.13 0.04 0.03
Malawi 1987 SSA 0.92 0 0 0.10 1.38 0.02 0.02
Malaysia 2010 EAP 0.68 0.49 0.43 0 0.88 0.19 0.06
Maldives 2006 SA 0.76 0 0.42 0.10 0.79 0.19 0.06
Mali 2006 SSA 0.55 0.12 0.18 0 1.14 0.09 0.03
Malta 2010 EU 0.79 0.72 0.48 0 0.80 0.22 0.08
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Mauritius 2010 SSA 0.66 0.51 0.45 0 0.84 0.20 0.06
Mexico 2008 LAC 0.62 0.10 0.40 0 0.90 0.17 0.04
Mongolia 2009 EAP 0.64 0.63 0.08 0 1.08 0.09 0.07
Morocco 2008 MENA 0.76 0.54 0.63 0 0.99 0.26 0.07
Mozambique 2003 SSA 0.82 0.42 0 0 1.16 0.06 0.06
Namibia 2008 SSA 0.54 0 0.22 0.03 0.78 0.11 0.04
Nepal 2001 SA 0.03 0 0.23 0.07 1.27 0.08 0.00
Netherlands 2010 EU 0.65 0.48 0.15 0 0.79 0.11 0.06
New Zealand 2008 EAP 0.54 0.52 0.12 0 0.81 0.09 0.05
Nicaragua 2010 LAC 0.72 0 0.29 0.07 0.93 0.14 0.05
Niger 2005 SSA 0.50 0 0.62 0.02 1.48 0.23 0.00
Norway 2010 EU 0.64 0.75 0.10 0 0.74 0.09 0.06
Oman 2000 MENA 0.69 0.31 0.84 0 0.79 0.33 0.06
Pakistan 2008 SA 0.98 0.70 0.74 0 1.05 0.30 0.10
Panama 2008 LAC 0.51 0.32 0.40 0 0.97 0.17 0.04
Paraguay 2010 LAC 0.55 0 0.39 0.04 0.99 0.16 0.03
Peru 2008 LAC 0.55 0 0.16 0.06 0.97 0.09 0.03
Philippines 2008 EAP 0.54 0.17 0.37 0 1.00 0.16 0.04
Poland 2010 EU 0.50 0.41 0.18 0 0.85 0.10 0.04
Portugal 2010 EU 0.59 0.22 0.12 0 0.85 0.08 0.05
Qatar 2007 MENA 0.77 1 0.86 0 0.65 0.34 0.08
Romania 2010 EU 0.60 0.56 0.19 0 0.92 0.11 0.06
Russia 2008 EU 0.39 0.36 0.04 0 0.73 0.05 0.03
Rwanda 1996 SSA 0.19 0 0 0.05 1.25 0.01 0.01
Sao Tome 1991 SSA 0.76 0 0.50 0.01 0.93 0.21 0.05
Senegal 1991 SSA 0.91 0 0.16 0.02 1.12 0.09 0.04
Seychelles 1987 SSA 0.27 0.67 0.31 0 0.82 0.13 0.03
Singapore 2010 EAP 0.56 0.60 0.23 0 0.78 0.12 0.05
Slovenia 2010 EU 0.59 0.61 0.15 0 0.78 0.10 0.06
South Africa 2010 SSA 0.63 0.17 0.23 0 0.76 0.12 0.05
Spain 2010 EU 0.51 0.49 0.21 0 0.80 0.11 0.05
Sri Lanka 2009 SA 0.75 0.39 0.47 0 0.98 0.20 0.06
St Kitts and Nevis 2001 LAC 0.64 0.56 0.13 0 0.76 0.1 0.06
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St Vincent and the Grenadines 1991 LAC 0.52 0.34 0.47 0 0.88 0.19 0.04
Suriname 1998 LAC 0.75 0.59 0.52 0 0.86 0.23 0.07
Swaziland 1997 SSA 0.21 0 0.31 0.15 0.84 0.12 0.02
Sweden 2010 EU 0.70 0.68 0.11 0 0.75 0.1 0.07
Switzerland 2010 EU 0.60 0.38 0.16 0 0.74 0.10 0.05
Tanzania 2006 SSA 0.60 0 0 0.03 1.36 0.01 0.01
Thailand 2010 SA 0.60 0.32 0.16 0 1.01 0.1 0.05
Trinidad and Tobago 2005 LAC 0.49 0.42 0.33 0 0.85 0.15 0.04
Tunisia 1994 MENA 0.73 0.47 0.70 0 0.90 0.28 0.07
Turkey 2010 CA 0.81 0.52 0.60 0 0.90 0.25 0.08
Uganda 2003 SSA 0.51 0.24 0 0 1.18 0.03 0.03
United Arab Emirates 2008 MENA 0.80 0.96 0.77 0 0.67 0.31 0.08
United Kingdom 2010 EU 0.60 0.60 0.13 0 0.82 0.1 0.06
Uruguay 2010 LAC 0.53 0.21 0.14 0 0.90 0.09 0.04
Vietnam 2004 EAP 0.57 0.40 0.04 0 1.11 0.06 0.05
Yemen 1999 MENA 0.85 0.35 0.67 0 1.00 0.27 0.07
Zambia 2000 SSA 0.67 0.42 0 0 1.11 0.05 0.05
Zimbabwe 2002 SSA 0.44 0 0.08 0.14 1.08 0.05 0.02
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